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the role of swat unIts
amIdst changIng dynamIcs of counterterrorIst hostage rescue
This essay examines whether tactical counterterror-
ist (CT) responses are optimised to handle suicidal 
assaults that potentially involve hostage seizure. It 
suggests that they are not: such responses are in-
stead based upon an anachronistic model that has 
diminishing applicability to today’s terror threats. 
There is a need to review and update the concepts 
that underlie them, in line with the peculiar chal-
lenges posed by nihilistically driven mass casualty 
terrorism. 
The essay shall first study the evolution of CT re-
sponses, showing how Special Weapons and Tactics 
(SWAT) units have become crucial elements of gov-
ernment strategy. It suggests that the use of SWAT 
to resolve political hostage-taking incidents was a 
post-1972 development, grounded in lessons learnt 
from Israeli counterterrorist experience as well as the 
Munich Olympics Massacre. The tactical concepts 
that guided the use of CT-SWAT were defensive or 
‘reactive’: they did not encourage immediate and ag-
gressive responses to an ongoing crisis. 
The essay shall compare and contrast six terrorist in-
cidents that had to be resolved by SWAT personnel. 
Three of these incidents are cases of ‘conventional’ 
terrorism, in which terrorists took hostages with the 
aim of obtaining political concessions through dia-
logue. The remaining three cases are terrorist attacks 
where the main purpose was not negotiation, but 
mass murder. The essay will conclude by assessing 
the implications of this trend for CT-SWAT units.1 
orIgIns of counterterrorIst rescue unIts 
According to some observers, one of the first coun-
tries to create a dedicated CT response unit was 
I srael. In 1957, the Israeli army raised a commando 
force called Sayaret Matkal to carry out cross-border 
raids against Palestinian guerrilla bases. Its offensive 
tasking allowed the unit to assume a ‘proactive’ mis-
sion profile. Sayaret Matkal could choose the target, 
timing and technique of its assaults, thereby taking 
the Palestinians by surprise and forcing them to fight 
defensively. 
During the late 1960s however, a new threat ap-
peared which reversed the balance of advantages. 
The Palestinians began to carry out airline hijackings. 
Suddenly, it was the Israelis who had to learn how to 
operate in reactive mode.2 They needed to improvise 
techniques that would permit them to contain and 
resolve a crisis initiated by their enemies. In opera-
tional terms, reactive counterterrorism was far more 
difficult than proactive counterterrorism because it 
allowed little time for preparation. 
Owing to its established expertise in counter- 
guerrilla operations, Sayaret Matkal was given ad-
ditional responsibility for anti-hijacking operations. 
On 9 May 1972, the unit carried out the first ever 
commando assault on a hijacked aircraft. Sixteen 
soldiers, disguised as fuel technicians, approached 
an airliner that had been seized by four Palestinian 
terrorists. While Israeli negotiators kept the terrorists 
preoccupied, the assault team moved into position 
and, upon a pre-arranged signal, stormed the plane 
simultaneously through three different entrances. All 
four terrorists were neutralised and only one hostage 
died. 
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The same year, another development proved that 
specialised CT response units were a necessity and 
not a luxury for democratic countries. On 5 Septem-
ber 1972, eight Palestinian terrorists infiltrated the 
Olympic Games Village in Munich, Germany and 
took nine Israeli athletes hostage. Two other Israe-
lis were killed by the terrorists while resisting. The 
local police considered a number of options, before 
deciding to mount a rescue operation when the ter-
rorists were exiting the country. Five snipers were 
positioned at vantage points around a local airfield, 
from where the terrorists and their hostages were to 
be flown out of Germany. 
The rescue operation went horribly wrong. The snip-
ers had been incorrectly briefed that there were only 
five terrorists. When they realised that there were 
in fact, eight, they could not warn the remainder of 
the rescue team because they did not have radios. 
A seventy-five minute gun battle followed, during 
which the terrorists were offered several chances 
to surrender. Eventually, the security forces had to 
mount an infantry assault using armoured personnel 
carriers. As soon as the terrorists realised they were 
cornered, they killed all nine hostages. Three of the 
gunmen were arrested, while five others died in the 
battle. 
The fiasco at Munich demonstrated that hostage 
rescue operations required specific intelligence and 
specialised training, particularly in firearms usage. 
Within weeks, a number of European governments, 
worried about the risk of copy-cat operations by the 
Palestinians, issued orders for the creation of hos-
tage rescue teams. Germany raised one such team 
from its border police, while Britain opted instead 
to create a hostage rescue team within its premier 
army commando unit, the 22nd Special Air Service 
Regiment. 
fusIon of two concePts – negotIatIon and swat 
There was, however, one important exception to 
this general trend towards militarisation of CT ca-
pabilities. The United States was averse to the idea 
of deploying military personnel for domestic security 
operations. Accordingly, responsibility for handling 
hostage incidents remained solely with the civil-
ian law enforcement community. At the time of the 
Munich Massacre, this community had been de-
veloping a hostage rescue concept that would soon 
be copied across the globe, including by European 
governments. Pioneered by the New York Police 
Department, the concept was called ‘contain and 
negotiate’. It emphasised that the use of force to re-
solve a hostage crisis should be a last resort. Instead, 
focus should be put on isolating the terrorists from 
outside contact and then opening a dialogue with 
them. Specially trained negotiators should convince 
the terrorists that since they were completely sur-
rounded, the best option would be for them to sur-
render peacefully.3 
The ‘contain and negotiate’ concept had three ad-
vantages. First, it would keep open the possibility of a 
hostage situation being resolved without bloodshed. 
The long-established police norm of using minimal 
force would be maintained, which was important 
from a public relations perspective. From past ter-
rorist incidents and especially the Munich Massacre, 
it had become obvious that public opinion would 
blame the government for any hostage deaths. In the 
1970s, democratic countries were not yet prepared 
to take hard line policies against hostage-takers, with 
Israel being a notable exception. Therefore, it was 
important that a rescue operation should be seen as 
solely motivated by concern for the hostages’ safety, 
rather than by political considerations of wanting to 
appear ‘tough on terrorism’.
The second advantage of ‘contain and negotiate’ was 
to buy time for an assault plan to be developed. If a 
rescue operation became necessary then the opera-
tion needed to be as quick and surgical as possible. 
Munich and subsequent attacks had shown that if 
confronted but not instantly overwhelmed, terrorists 
would kill their hostages in order to create a backlash 
against the government. Thus, it was vital that the 
assault force be briefed in detail about the number 
of terrorists, their weapons, physical appearance and 
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location within the engagement area. Acquiring this 
kind of information required time, as did rehearsals 
for the assault. Negotiations were intended to buy 
such time – and also, to wear down the terrorists. 
Lastly, the concept would ensure that, if and when a 
decision to storm was taken by the government, ne-
gotiators could distract the terrorists at the moment 
of assault. This would buy vital seconds and con-
fuse the terrorists’ response, minimising harm to the 
hostages. When well executed, rescue missions us-
ing the ‘contain and negotiate’ concept proved quite 
successful at lowering the risk of hostage-taking (as 
will be demonstrated later in the essay). However, 
the concept was based on a crucial assumption: that 
the terrorist(s) wanted to keep the hostages alive in 
order to bargain for their common safety and would 
only kill a hostage if provoked. There was an implicit 
recognition amongst the concept’s NYPD origina-
tors that if a hostage-taker was intent on killing his/
her victim, little could be done to prevent it. 
Meanwhile, on the west coast of the United States, 
a parallel development was taking place. Facing dif-
ficulties with breaking through armed barricades and 
serving arrest warrants against hardened criminals, 
the Los Angeles Police Department raised a special-
ist urban assault unit. Called Special Weapons At-
tack Team (later modified to Special Weapons and 
Tactics), the unit consisted of sixty highly-trained 
marksmen. They drilled in secret, purchasing spe-
cific-to-task gear with their own personal funds. 
The unit only came to public attention in May 1974 
when it stormed a hideout of the Simbionese Libera-
tion Army, an anarchist group. 
The LAPD SWAT’s tactical philosophy took a prag-
matic approach to hostage situations, planning for 
the worst (an armed assault) but hoping for the best 
(a negotiated solution). The sophisticated combat 
skills of unit members, many of whom were ex-
soldiers, made LAPD SWAT the gold standard of 
police urban assault teams the world over. Even so, 
the unit almost never had to deal with political hos-
tage-takers; most of its opponents were gangsters or 
emotionally unstable ‘lone wolf ’ gunmen. In case a 
standoff with such individuals involved the presence 
of hostages, it was almost always accidental – the 
result of a bungled robbery or a broken relationship. 
Killing a hostage in cold blood was not the perpetra-
tor’s aim; a factor which allowed police negotiators 
to try to talk him/her into surrendering. Notwith-
standing its considerable merits, the LAPD’s SWAT 
concept was not really tested against the toughest 
opponent of all – mass murderers irrevocably com-
mitted to dying for a political cause. In the following 
sections, this essay shall demonstrate that the ‘con-
tain and negotiate’ concept came to dominate tacti-
cal responses to terrorist incidents since the 1970s, 
with SWAT being kept as a standby option. This led 
to the emergence of a predictable behaviour pattern 
by security forces, which terrorists are now learning 
to exploit to devastating effect. 
‘conventIonal’ hostage-takIng 
For want of space, this essay shall only discuss three 
cases where the ‘contain and negotiate’ concept has 
been combined with a SWAT assault, resulting in a 
successful rescue mission. Each hostage-taking in-
cident was non-suicidal, i.e. the terrorists initiated it 
believing that they would be able to negotiate a fa-
vourable compromise that would allow them to walk 
away unscathed. In each case, they sought to use 
hostages as bargaining tools, which required keep-
ing them alive. This worked to the advantage of both 
negotiators and SWAT units, with the former buying 
time for the latter to prepare an assault plan based 
on detailed intelligence. 
examPle 1: oPeratIon fIre magIc 
On 13 October 1977, four Palestinian terrorists hi-
jacked a Lufthansa flight with eighty-six passengers 
and five crew members. For three days, they forced 
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it to fly aimlessly around the Mediterranean and 
Middle East, making refuelling stops in five coun-
tries. Eventually, on 17 October, the aircraft touched 
down at an airfield in Mogadishu, Somalia. During 
this time, the terrorists demanded a ransom of USD 
15 million and called for the release of several ter-
rorists being held in German and Turkish jails. The 
German government was initially prepared to con-
cede the ransom demand. Even as it prepared con-
tingency plans for a rescue mission, it dispatched the 
money along with an official team of negotiators. 
By the time the plane touched down at Mogadishu 
however, the situation had changed. In one of his 
many fits of rage, the terrorists’ leader had shot 
dead the captain of the aircraft. News of the kill-
ing prompted the German government to harden 
its stance: compromising with the hijackers had be-
come impossible since they had already taken a life. 
All that negotiations could do was keep the terrorists 
distracted while a rescue attempt was made. The as-
sault was carried out by a unit raised after the 1972 
Munich attack. Known as Grenzschutzgruppe 
(GSG) 9, it had been shadowing the hijacked aircraft 
since day one of the crisis. Even before receiving fi-
nal clearance for the mission, the thirty-man assault 
team carried out several rehearsals in cooperation 
with a two-man advisory team sent by the British 
SAS.4 
The advisors provided GSG 9 with stun grenades; 
at the time, a new weapon for counterterrorist units. 
Using these, the assault team stormed the airliner at 
night, neutralising all four terrorists. The entry tech-
nique was innovative for that era: ladders were used 
to silently raise operators to their start positions. At 
a prearranged signal, Somali troops lit a fire 300 
yards in front of the aircraft, distracting the terrorists. 
Two of the hijackers were in the cockpit at the time, 
where they had been negotiating over the radio with 
German officials. The fire focused their attention to 
the front, away from the passengers who were con-
centrated in the rear of the aircraft. When the assault 
commenced, the terrorists were too disorientated by 
the stun grenades to respond effectively. The GSG 9 
team meanwhile, used their superior firearms train-
ing to swiftly neutralise any threat to themselves 
or the hostages. As a result, there were no friendly 
deaths during the entire assault, which lasted under 
five minutes. 
examPle 2: oPeratIon nImrod 
The next example of a textbook hostage rescue mis-
sion occurred in May 1980. Six terrorists seized 
the Iranian embassy in London, taking twenty-six 
hostages. Within fourteen minutes of the attack, 
22nd SAS received unofficial word of it through the 
Metropolitan Police. Without waiting for an official 
request from civilian authorities, the unit deployed 
its twenty-five-man hostage rescue team to London 
and placed another team on standby to move as well. 
The first troops assumed pre-assault positions in a 
building adjoining the Iranian embassy some sixteen 
hours after the crisis had begun. They were relieved 
twenty-four hours later by the standby team. 
Over the next three days, the two teams rotated be-
tween rehearsing for a deliberate assault and being 
prepared for immediate action if the terrorists began 
killing hostages. The SAS already had details of the 
internal layout of the embassy, but needed specific 
information on the location and resistance capabili-
ties of the terrorists, as well as identifying data about 
them. They were helped by information collected 
from microphones and cameras which were inserted 
into the embassy walls from adjacent buildings and 
debriefings of released hostages. 
From the onset of the crisis, the British government 
adopted a policy of negotiating with the terrorists, 
but only to get them to surrender. There was no 
question of them being allowed to go free. In ad-
dition, the government decided that if the terrorists 
killed a hostage deliberately, it would authorise a 
rescue mission. Since the terrorists had issued dead-
lines, suggesting that they would kill the hostages 
one-by-one rather than altogether, the government 
negotiating team sought to buy time. Even after one 
of the hostages had been killed, it kept up a pretence 
of negotiating in order to lull the terrorists into a false 
sense of security. 
When the SAS finally stormed the embassy, over 
151 hours had elapsed since the crisis had begun. 
The assault was almost flawless, despite glitches 
caused by faulty equipment and outdated intel-
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ligence about the hostages’ exact location. When 
the attack commenced, negotiators made sure that 
the terrorist leader was kept preoccupied talking to 
them, thus causing confusion among the remaining 
terrorists over what was going on. All six terrorists 
were neutralised, one hostage died during the as-
sault and the SAS suffered no fatalities. 
examPle 3: oPeratIon chavIn de  
huantar 
The last conventional hostage crisis that this essay 
shall examine is the seizure of the Japanese ambas-
sador’s residence in Peru. On 17 December 1996, 
fourteen left-wing terrorists attacked a diplomatic 
reception, taking almost 700 hostages. Within a 
few hours, 300 of these were released. Over the fol-
lowing weeks and months, the Peruvian government 
made a show of negotiating for the release of the 
remaining hostages. However, it had already made 
a secret decision to go for a rescue mission, using 
the negotiations as a cover. For 126 days, the gov-
ernment stalled the terrorists, on some occasions by 
openly stating its contempt for them and refusing to 
talk. The terrorists meanwhile, did not carry out any 
of their threats to execute hostages and kept scaling 
down their demands while releasing more hostages. 
Through the course of the negotiations, the govern-
ment realised that it was not dealing with hardened 
killers and could afford to play for time indefinitely. 
Beginning in January 1997, the government secretly 
hired sixty miners to build seven tunnels into the 
ambassadorial compound. It planted listening de-
vices throughout the building and even managed to 
smuggle in a transmitter to the hostages so that res-
cue forces could have real-time intelligence on the 
terrorists’ whereabouts. Once all preparations were 
complete, 140 commandos stormed into the com-
pound through the tunnels. The breaching charges 
attached to the tunnel exits killed five of the terror-
ists outright, while the remaining nine were gunned 
down throughout the building. No hostages were 
killed, although this was partly due to the terrorists’ 
reluctance to shoot unarmed civilians. The security 
forces lost two officers, including the commander of 
the rescue force and one soldier. Of the seventy-two 
hostages still left in the compound, only one died (of 
a heart attack). 
shIft towards mass casualty terrorIsm 
By the turn of millennium, it was becoming obvious 
to more sophisticated terrorist groups that taking 
hostages and hoping to extract political concessions 
were not a viable strategy. Many governments had 
developed sufficiently advanced capabilities for hos-
tage rescue to ensure that any prolonged siege ended 
on their terms. Airline hijacking was nearly impos-
sible due to better airport security and international 
treaties that prohibited states from providing shelter 
to hijackers (an obvious exception here being the hi-
jacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC814 in December 
1999). Even if an aircraft could be seized, inability 
to find a safe haven ensured that, short of going in 
for a suicide mission, terrorists would have difficulty 
in ‘winning’ in a hijack situation. It was within this 
context that Al Qaeda adopted suicidal hijacking as 
an attack technique, with spectacular results on 11 
September 2001.5 
 
Around the same time, the Pakistani terrorist group 
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) began experimenting with 
suicidal assault or ‘fidayeen’ attacks. The innovation 
was reportedly introduced by a former Special Forces 
soldier who had become a jihadist. He had previ-
ously served in a counterterrorist unit and knew how 
police first responders as well as SWAT teams were 
trained to react to hostage incidents. He therefore 
developed an attack technique that focused on caus-
ing maximum damage during the initial minutes of 
an attack, i.e. before security forces could respond. 
Instead of prolonging a crisis through dialogue, the 
terrorists were to massacre as many people as pos-
sible and then die fighting. Initially, fidayeen attacks 
were concentrated on ‘hard’ or protected targets, 
such as military bases. From May 2002 however, 
LeT realised that it could produce a much higher 
body count by attacking ‘soft’ targets. 
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Through combining suicidal tactics with mass casu-
alty attacks, Al Qaeda and LeT had inadvertently 
discovered a way of sabotaging the ‘contain and ne-
gotiate’ concept. No longer could CT-SWAT units 
rely on negotiators to buy time, while they planned 
and rehearsed for carrying out the perfect assault. 
The proliferation of 24/7 news coverage had re-
moved a major bargaining chip held by governments: 
that of providing media coverage of the terrorists’ ac-
tions. Previously, one of the demands made by ter-
rorists would be that news organisations give public-
ity to them and their cause. The same effect could 
now be achieved by carrying out a spectacular attack 
upon a soft target in full view of the international 
media. Moreover, since the terrorists were not con-
cerned about the personal consequences of their ac-
tions, negotiators could not appeal to their survival 
instincts and persuade them to surrender. 
The result of this adaptation in terrorism has been 
the emergence of a highly virulent threat: suicidal 
attacks that focus on killing as many people as pos-
sible in a short span of time. Any hostage situation 
that might unfold is only incidental and meant to 
slow down the security forces’ response, by in-
creasing the risk of collateral damage. The hostages 
themselves are not intended to be ransomed off in 
exchange for money and/or political concessions. 
Rather, they are human shields whose sole purpose 
is to allow the perpetrators to prolong the duration of 
their attack and maximise the media attention it re-
ceives. Unlike terrorists of the 1970s and ’80s, who 
were prepared to die but preferred to live, today’s 
terrorists have created commando-style martyrdom 
teams whose sole purpose is to sacrifice themselves 
for the cause. The essay shall now focus on three 
cases where massacre was the primary objective of 
a terrorist attack, rather than a by-product of rescue 
efforts by security forces. 
examPle 1: beslan 2004 school  
massacre 
What happened at Beslan, a small town in south-
ern Russia, in September 2004 was so horrific 
that scholars have since been at a loss to explain 
it. A group of between thirty and fifty jihadists from 
Chechnya and Ingushetia, plus a few Arab merce-
naries, seized a school and took over 1,100 people 
hostage. The victims were not only small children, 
but also their parents, grandparents and teachers. 
The day of the attack, 1 September, was the begin-
ning of the Russian school year and was tradition-
ally marked by celebrations across the country. The 
choice of timing showed that the terrorists wanted to 
take as many hostages as they could. 
The attackers came extremely well prepared, with 
military uniforms and weaponry. Eight people were 
killed in the initial assault, of whom two were se-
curity personnel who instinctively confronted the 
terrorists, not knowing how badly they were out-
numbered. By executing another six civilians and 
displaying their bodies to the hostages, who included 
relatives of the dead, the terrorists established total 
control over the compound within fifteen minutes. 
The sheer brutality of their assault, together with its 
suddenness, had anyway caused many hostages to 
go into shock. They told themselves that what was 
happening could not be a terrorist attack, but was 
only a security drill. 
Over the next two days, the terrorists methodically 
selected another twenty-one men and boys for ex-
ecution. Their aim was to crush any thoughts of 
resistance among the hostages by eliminating eve-
ryone who seemed physically capable of challenging 
them. Before being killed, the victims were made to 
lift heavy furniture and barricade some of the school 
entrances. Other entrances were rigged with explo-
sives. 
The Beslan attack was a hybrid of conventional and 
suicidal terrorism. On the one hand, the terrorists 
issued a list of demands and threatened to execute 
the hostages in batches if Russian forces made any 
moves against the school. On the other hand, their 
demands were of a tactical nature, intended to buy 
time for the building to be fortified. There was no ex-
planation for the motive behind the attack, or what 
they wanted in return for the hostages’ release. Ef-
forts by government officials to open negotiations on 
these broader issues were rebuffed. 
Gradually, it became clear that the terrorists had 
no endgame in mind. They modified their stance 
on talks as time passed, agreeing to negotiate with 
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the government through an intermediary. After a 
promising start, during which they released thirty-
two hostages, the terrorists suddenly upped the ante 
by demanding that Russian forces withdraw from 
Chechnya and grant the region independence. Such 
an unrealistic demand, allegedly made at the urg-
ing of jihadist masterminds who were observing the 
crisis from afar, drastically reduced the chances of 
a peaceful resolution. The authors of the demand 
must have known this. 
Russian Special Forces (known as Spetsnaz) had 
alerted their elite CT units to the takeover of the 
school within seventy-five minutes of it occurring. 
The units took another thirteen hours to reach the 
site from Moscow, owing to shortfalls in airlift ca-
pacity. In total, about 400 Spetsnaz troops were 
eventually deployed at the school. These were or-
ganised into three teams of 133 men each. While 
one team began rehearsing for a deliberate assault 
at a secret location eighteen miles away, the other 
two took turns standing guard at the security cordon 
around the school. 
A massacre of the hostages suddenly began on day 
three of the crisis, due to a tragic accident. At 1305 
hrs, an improvised explosive device suspended mid-
air in the school gymnasium came loose and deto-
nated upon hitting the floor. Most of the hostages 
were being held in the gym and the terrorists had 
planted a large number of pressure-release IEDs 
there. A chain reaction occurred, with several blasts 
happening within seconds in the densely packed 
room. After ten minutes, the roof caught fire and be-
gan falling in, trapping the hostages under burning 
debris. Meanwhile, the terrorists fired in every di-
rection. Some shot at the security forces, mistakenly 
believing that a rescue mission had been launched. 
Others concentrated on killing as many hostages 
as they could, knowing that they would soon die as 
well. 
The 133-man Spetsnaz team then on standby 
outside the school was initially unsure of how to 
respond. Although they immediately retaliated to 
the incoming fire, they did not advance upon the 
school since they had no orders to do so. It was 
only at 1340 hrs that some junior officers, perceiv-
ing that a full-scale slaughter was taking place, de-
cided to storm the building without clearance from 
above. They then tried to enter through a door on 
the southern side. Finding it booby-trapped and 
coming under fire, they used a tank to clear the en-
trance. Meanwhile, another group of commandos 
launched a separate attack from the east side of the 
compound, entering through the windows. Between 
them, the two groups of soldiers engaged the terror-
ists and provided covering fire for hundreds of pan-
icking hostages to escape. 
The battle at the school went on for ten hours, dur-
ing which the initial 133-man assault team was re-
inforced by the other two teams. Entry was effected 
from multiple points, without any coordination. The 
rescue personnel relied entirely on their training and 
experience to pull them through the battle, since 
they had no real-time intelligence on how the inter-
nal topography of the building had been altered by 
the terrorists over the past two days, or even where 
the terrorists were. When the fighting wound down 
on the night of 3 September 2004, thirty-one terror-
ists had been killed and one captured. An unknown 
number is thought to have escaped by masquerading 
as hostages or aid workers. Eleven commandos had 
died, as well as ten soldiers from supporting units. 
The final death toll for the hostages was 338, in-
cluding those killed before the assault – a level of 
carnage which guaranteed international attention. 
examPle 2: mumbaI 2008 
The second suicidal-cum-mass casualty attack that 
this essay shall examine is the 2008 Mumbai Mas-
sacre. The facts are well known: ten Lashkar-e-Toiba 
terrorists, who had been trained for eighteen months 
in assault tactics, conducted a fidayeen raid that 
killed 165 people at five different locations. Hav-
ing reached Mumbai by boat, they carried enough 
ammunition on their persons to fight for some days. 
Interrogation of the sole surviving terrorist has re-
vealed that the tactical objectives of the attack were 
two-fold. First, the terrorists were to manoeuvre in 
buddy pairs and kill as many people as they could 
in the initial hours of the assault. Thereafter, they 
were to take hostages, fortify themselves and issue 
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demands to the Indian government. The nature of 
these demands was to have been revealed to them 
via telephone by LeT handlers based in Pakistan. In-
formation on the responses of Indian security forces 
would be relayed by the handlers, who would moni-
tor media reports of the situation. 
Investigations have revealed that the attack was not 
motivated by any grand plan, other than to boost the 
morale of jihadist groups and deflect domestic Paki-
stani turmoil onto India. It was preceded by months 
of tactical reconnaissance. Consequently, the gun-
men had no difficulty navigating through heavy traf-
fic to their assigned targets. However, it appears from 
eyewitness accounts that they had only a general 
idea of the layout of the buildings. Once the initial 
shock effect of the coordinated assaults had worn 
off, most civilians in the vicinity of each attack site 
hid or barricaded themselves. The gunmen thus had 
no more targets to shoot at. Their operation frag-
mented, with each fidayeen team fighting indepen-
dently of the others and relying on encouragement 
and tactical advice provided by their controllers in 
Pakistan. 
The Indian security response varied from one loca-
tion to another. Poorly-trained and underequipped 
policemen were gunned down in sizeable numbers 
by one fidayeen buddy pair, which attacked a train 
station and a hospital. At two other locations, which 
were hotel complexes, the police conducted recon-
naissance probes to assess the situation and then 
settled into a static defence role. At a fourth location 
(the city’s Jewish cultural centre, located in a densely 
crowded neighbourhood called Nariman Point), they 
focused on evacuating nearby buildings and creating 
a security cordon, since it was too dangerous to ap-
proach the terrorists. 
Responsibility for closing in with the terrorists fell 
upon two specialist assault units drawn from the 
Indian military: the MARCOS (Marine Comman-
dos) and the NSG (National Security Guards). Both 
units performed as best they could within the limi-
tations of the ‘contain and negotiate’ concept that 
guided their employment. As per this concept, the 
military had to wait for a formal request from civilian 
authorities before intervening. The MARCOS, who 
were already based in Mumbai, moved swiftly after 
receiving the request. Within an hour and without 
any tactical intelligence, they entered both hotel 
complexes simultaneously. At the Taj Palace and 
Tower Hotel, their prompt action probably saved the 
lives of 200 civilians. These people had been hid-
ing in an isolated part of the hotel and the terrorists 
were specifically looking for them. The MARCOS’ 
sudden arrival drove the terrorists away. Meanwhile 
at the other hotel complex, the Marine Comman-
dos blocked key passages, restricting the terrorists’ 
mobility. 
Between them, the MARCOS and NSG evacuated 
over 800 civilians from the two hotel complexes 
and cleared over 1,500 rooms. The NSG arrived 
within twelve hours of the terrorist attack beginning 
– which is around the average time that a CT-SWAT 
unit would take to deploy for a cross-country rescue 
mission under the ‘contain and negotiate’ paradigm. 
Subsequently, the NSG was criticised for being too 
slow to reach Mumbai, but this criticism misses the 
point: no counterterrorist unit in the world is politi-
cally authorised and logistically supported for imme-
diate engagement in a situation where there are no 
ongoing negotiations to buy it time. (In 1980, the 
SAS took much longer to reach the Iranian embassy 
from its base in Hereford. At the time, nobody paid 
any attention to this fact, because the British unit 
was only confronting a conventional hostage siege 
and not a massacre.) 
It was due to the NSG and MARCOS that the Mum-
bai terrorist attacks never reached their planned 
second stage: that of multiple hostage sieges.6 In-
stead, once the terrorists came under fire from these 
units, they concentrated on retaliating and tacti-
cal manoeuvres and did not spend any more time 
looking for civilians to kill. Whatever civilian deaths 
occurred, happened within the first six hours (with 
over one hundred in the first sixty minutes alone). 
No counterterrorist unit could have prevented them, 
unless it had been authorised to deploy and engage 
the terrorists literally within minutes of the first shots 
being fired. For this, existing concepts of SWAT em-
ployment in rescue missions would have to be re-
vised. 
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examPle 3: oslo-utøya 2011
The third and final suicidal/mass casualty terrorist 
incident that this essay shall examine is the bombing 
and shooting spree that happened in Norway on 22 
July 2011. The attacks were carried out by a sin-
gle individual, operating alone, who managed to kill 
seventy-seven people in three hours, sixty-eight of 
them by gunfire. The killer was a right-wing militant 
angry at the changing political landscape of Norway. 
He first planted a vehicle-borne IED (improvised 
explosive device) in the government quarter of the 
Norwegian capital Oslo and then drove forty-five 
kilometres to a scenic lake in the countryside. At the 
centre of this lake was a large island called Utøya, 
where an annual summer camp was being held by 
600 youth activists of the Labour Party (Arbeider-
partiet), the leading party in the current Norwegian 
government. Dressed in a policeman’s uniform, he 
arrived at the island by boat. After initially claiming 
that he was there for a routine security check, he 
opened fire with a semi-automatic rifle and a hand-
gun. 
The car bomb in Oslo exploded at 1526 hrs.7 With-
in a couple of minutes, the Norwegian police’s CT 
unit, nicknamed ‘Delta Force’, was alerted. Having 
rehearsed many times for a terrorist attack, it re-
sponded immediately. Twenty operatives in assault 
gear left for the bomb site from their base a few kilo-
metres away. They arrived at 1535 hrs, nine min-
utes after the explosion and three minutes after the 
first news reports had been broadcast. Their leader 
contacted emergency services, to find out if the ex-
plosion was deliberate or accidental. 
At 1710 hrs, Oslo police confirmed to the media 
that the explosion had been caused by a bomb. 
There was no information as yet on the number of 
people killed. Around the same time, campers along 
the lake shoreline across from Utøya island started 
hearing gunshots. Panic-stricken teenagers on the 
island dialled police hotlines on their mobile phones. 
At 1726 hrs, police in a town near Utøya were in-
formed about gunfire on the island. They contacted 
the Oslo police within four minutes to update them 
and, eight minutes later, made a formal request for 
support from Delta Force. Within a minute, eight 
Delta operatives were on the road towards Utøya. 
There has been some criticism about the team’s de-
cision to travel the forty-five kilometres from Oslo 
to Utøya by road. Some commentators have argued 
that the team should have been airlifted by helicop-
ter, so that they could have arrived earlier and saved 
more lives. The unit had a surveillance helicopter on 
standby, equipped with the latest tracking technolo-
gy. However, it was too small to transport an assault 
team. For that, Delta Force had maintained an ar-
rangement with the Norwegian military that allowed 
it to use army helicopters for rapid deployment. 
Once again, there was an intervening variable: the 
helicopters were not stationed on-site at the Delta 
base, but at a military airfield fifty kilometres south of 
Oslo. By the time they would have arrived to pick up 
the assault team, more lives would have been lost. A 
snap decision was therefore made, to let the Delta 
operators travel to Utøya by road. 
The team reached the lakeshore opposite the island 
by 1809 hrs, just as the local police were arranging 
a boat to transport them across. They reached the 
island at 1825 hrs, roughly an hour and fifteen min-
utes after the gunman had first opened fire. At the 
time of landing, they did not know how many ter-
rorists were on the island, or even what they looked 
like. Their task was made easy, however, by the 
gunman’s own intentions. He had already decided 
before the massacre that he would surrender to the 
police, so that he could explain the rationale for the 
killings. As soon as he saw them, he walked towards 
the Delta team with hands raised. At this juncture, 
the attack had a near-suicidal element to it, since 
the leading Delta operators were receiving orders 
over the radio to shoot him dead. Their chief was 
worried that the terrorist might have been wearing a 
bomb vest. Only at the very last minute did the team 
realise that the killer actually intended to surrender. 
They arrested him at 1827 hrs, two minutes after 
landing at Utøya. 
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sImIlarItIes between beslan, mumbaI and oslo-utøya
From an operational perspective, the last three in-
cidents discussed above share four similarities. 
Firstly, they were focused on soft targets, with the 
aim of maximising civilian deaths. Secondly, they 
were reckless to the point of being suicidal (since the 
perpetrators did not care about the consequences 
of their actions). Thirdly, they were characterised by 
complex challenges, which security forces had diffi-
culties in overcoming. Fourth, in each case, special-
ist hostage rescue units performed well as per the 
existing model of their use in counterterrorist mis-
sions. The problem was, that model did not match 
the type of situation these units faced on the ground. 
The units therefore, had to improvise tactically. 
At Beslan, Mumbai and Utøya, the concerned CT-
SWAT units were thrown into situations for which 
they were tactically unprepared. In the absence of 
coordinated support from other government agen-
cies, they had to fall back on the individual combat 
skills and tactical judgment of their field operators. 
It was these qualities, more than any other factor, 
which limited the number of lives lost. 
 
Unlike most incidents that counterterrorist SWAT 
units are created to handle, Beslan, Mumbai and 
Utøya were not conventional hostage situations. 
There was no time to prepare an ideal assault plan, 
while negotiators stalled the terrorists. The deliberate 
killing of civilians at the start of each incident had, in 
any case, negated the prospect of peaceful resolution 
through dialogue. Even at Beslan, which superficially 
resembled a hostage siege, the terrorists understood 
that their chances of survival were low, due to the 
hard line policies of the Russian government. Ac-
cordingly, they planted IEDs all over the school, in-
tending to kill themselves and as many hostages as 
possible, once a rescue mission started. At Mumbai 
and Utøya, there was no hostage crisis to begin with. 
In the former case, this was because of the relentless 
pressure maintained by Indian commandos. Quick 
reaction by the MARCOS, coupled with the NSG’s 
clearance operations, averted any standoff involving 
the use of civilians as human shields by the LeT ter-
rorists. As for Utøya, it was the gunman’s own plan 
that deviated from the conventional hostage crisis 
script: he never intended to take hostages. 
oPeratIonal assessment of beslan, mumbaI and utøya 
This essay shall now examine what it considers to 
be the biggest mistakes made by security forces in 
the three cases of mass casualty terrorism studied 
above. It shall also list the tactical actions by CT 
units which mitigated the damage done. 
beslan 
Mistake: Failure to prepare to a contingency assault 
Russian security forces were conscious of the politi-
cal sensitivity of the target – a school with hundreds 
of children – which hugely narrowed the margin for 
error. Emphasis was therefore put into planning 
and rehearsing for a perfect assault. There were no 
emergency protocols for an immediate storming ac-
tion if one became necessary. In Russia’s centralised 
political system, decision-making was monopolised 
by the top-most political leadership, thus robbing 
tactical commanders of the initiative. While jump-
ing off points for an attack had been pre-identified 
and the Spetsnaz commandos deployed quickly to 
these once fighting started, there was still no guid-
ing framework for the assault that was eventually 
launched. 
Mitigating factor: Competence in close quarters bat-
tle 
Spetsnaz operators did a good job of saving lives once 
fighting began in earnest. Here, they were helped by 
their tactical skills, plus confusion among the terror-
ists themselves. Everyone was caught off guard by 
the IED explosion in the school gymnasium and the 
subsequent battle forced the terrorists to divide their 
attention between shooting at the commandos and 
killing the hostages. Of the 338 civilians killed in 
the school, roughly 295 died in and around the gym 
as a result of explosions, small arms fire and fall-
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ing debris from the roof. Since their deaths had been 
caused by the terrorists’ own carelessness and sub-
sequent panicky reaction, CT-SWAT personnel on-
site could have done nothing to stop the massacre. 
Another twenty-nine victims had been executed in 
the preceding two days of the crisis, for no provoca-
tion whatsoever. Only nine hostages died in the rest 
of the school compound during the entire ten-hour 
battle. This extremely low death toll was due in part, 
to the Russian commandos’ tactic of continuously 
engaging the terrorists at close quarters, while also 
serving as human shields to absorb fire directed to-
wards the hostages. 
mumbaI 
Mistake: Failure of local police to engage terrorists 
aggressively 
The Mumbai police responded the attacks as per the 
‘contain and negotiate’ concept, which only makes 
first responders responsible for cordoning off an 
engagement area. The tasks of engaging and neu-
tralising the terrorists are supposed to be handled 
by specialist assault units. Thus, once the scale of 
the attacks became obvious, the police waited pas-
sively for commandos to take over. It did not use 
its 450-member Anti-Terrorist Squad, which was 
equipped with sixty assault rifles, to engage the ter-
rorists in continuous firing. Such a move might have 
prevented the additional deaths that took place while 
the MARCOS were waiting for civilian authorisation 
to intervene and the NSG was flying in from Delhi. 
Furthermore, the police should have used the MAR-
COS offensively instead of just asking them to secure 
key points until the NSG arrived. As highly trained 
fighters, the MARCOS would have been more than 
a match for the terrorists, if they had received police 
backup. 
Mitigating factor: NSG prioritised rescue efforts, 
even at the cost of prolonging the operation 
By focusing on evacuation, the NSG inadvertently 
limited the damage done by the terrorists. Once the 
initial bursts of firing had taken place, the terrorists 
were unable to gather large numbers of hostages/
human shields. Most hotel guests barricaded them-
selves in their rooms, while others were evacuated 
by staff. The choice of attacking hotels in any case, 
meant that the terrorists had unintentionally limited 
the number of hostages they could seize. Within 
each compartmentalised and sprawling hotel com-
plex, civilians could hide or fortify themselves and 
simply wait out the crisis. This luxury would not 
have been available in a more open-plan building 
structure. The NSG made optimal use of its finite 
manpower by focusing on floor-by-floor clearance, 
giving priority to civilian evacuation while also keep-
ing the terrorists engaged. However, it needs to be 
said that this slow approach could have been a costly 
mistake if an actual hostage situation had been cre-
ated by the terrorists. 
utøya
Mistake: Decision to send a small team without 
backup or tactical intelligence 
Delta Force reacted to a fluid situation with what-
ever resources they had readily available. This also 
required snap decisions regarding the employment 
of such resources. Unfolding events at the time sug-
gested that a large number of terrorists could have 
been involved at Utøya. Had there been more gun-
men, or had the terrorist ambushed the police when 
they arrived, the result could have been as cata-
strophic for security forces’ morale as the deaths of 
senior Mumbai police officials was in India on the 
night of 26 November 2008. 
Mitigating factor: Dispatching additional comman-
dos in a larger group 
Although Delta Force took a calculated risk by send-
ing a small team into a massacre site, it mitigated the 
danger by sending a large follow-up team minutes 
later. The lesson to be drawn by other CT-SWAT 
units from this incident is clear: even if extreme 
circumstances call for a piecemeal insertion of res-
cue teams, these must be reinforced at the earliest 
opportunity, since they could be manoeuvring into 
a trap. They are only reacting to tactical conditions 
created by the terrorist and still do not have full con-
trol over the engagement. 
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lessons for future rescue oPeratIons 
There are two lessons that can readily be drawn from 
the recent cases described above. These relate to the 
constantly changing standard by which ‘success’ in 
CT rescue missions is measured and the biased na-
ture of non-expert commentary on operational per-
formance. 
Number of civilian deaths is still important, but now so 
is speed of SWAT deployment and duration of engage-
ments 
At Beslan, only one location was attacked and the 
bulk of civilian deaths occurred late in the crisis. 
These factors prompted many commentators, es-
pecially outside Russia, to assume that the entire 
incident had been a ‘normal’ hostage siege as would 
often occur in the 1970s. Progressing from this log-
ic, they blamed the Spetsnaz for the large number 
of hostages killed. It was believed, erroneously, that 
fighting had broken out because the commandos 
launched a planned assault without concern for the 
hostages’ safety. No thought was given to the pos-
sibility that the siege ended in bloodshed because 
that was what the terrorists had intended all along. 
Although they did not deliberately trigger the IED 
blast that brought the gym roof crashing down, they 
had knowingly engineered a situation over the pre-
ceding two days that could only have produced the 
same outcome. 
At Mumbai, the sheer dynamism of the initial at-
tacks, with near-simultaneous massacres at five dif-
ferent locations, made clear that taking hostages was 
not the primary intention. Accordingly, so-called 
‘security experts’, both Indian and foreign, quietly 
shifted the goalposts for evaluating counterterror-
ist rescue efforts. Since they could not criticise the 
government’s decision to use force, they focused in-
stead on the length of time that it took to neutralise 
the terrorists. Suddenly, the number of civilian lives 
saved during rescue operations was not an indicator 
of a CT unit’s professional competence. Instead, the 
new yardstick became the speed with which such 
units reached the engagement area and the duration 
of their ‘render safe’ operations. Probably, those who 
criticised the NSG for being slow to reach Mumbai 
and then taking two days to neutralise the terrorists 
were unaware that they were challenging the very 
foundations of the ‘contain and negotiate’ concept. 
According to this concept, within which the NSG 
and other hostage rescue units have been trained 
to function, the longer a crisis lasts, the better it is 
being handled. This is because a slow-moving ap-
proach by the government shows that it is keen to 
minimise casualties. In 1988, the NSG had received 
international praise for using precisely such an ap-
proach to clear the Golden Temple of Sikh separatist 
terrorists, in what became known as Operation Black 
Thunder. Yet, when it adopted the same method in 
Mumbai, thereby preventing harm to civilians, it was 
criticised. 
Even the remarkably swift Norwegian response to 
the killings at Utøya has been scrutinised in a lop-
sided manner. Commentary has focused on the time 
that it took Delta operators to reach the island from 
Oslo. Less attention has been paid to the intrinsically 
destructive potential of the situation itself. The ter-
rorist could choose his target at leisure and he picked 
a physically isolated spot. Despite acting alone and 
not having automatic weapons, he was able to kill 
sixty-eight people in less than ninety minutes, due 
to the lack of a countervailing threat to himself. It 
was only the arrival of Delta operators that stopped 
him from shooting more youngsters. 
Biased and non-professional analysis of rescue opera-
tions disguises the real problem, which is the changing 
nature of terrorist threats 
With 24/7 media coverage and satellite television, 
there is considerable scope for commentators far 
from the action to make their views heard. Such 
views might be informed by facts, or by prejudice. 
Unfortunately, since most non-governmental securi-
ty analysts focus on policy and strategic issues, they 
do not have the competence to make an educated 
assessment of tactical performance. This means that 
their analysis of how counterterrorist responses are 
carried out can be based on outdated textbook con-
cepts with no application to reality, as well as first 
impressions developed through the media.8 
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Beslan is a prime example: blame for the numerous 
civilian deaths was attributed to the Russian govern-
ment on an almost reflexive basis, without thought 
to the on-ground conditions that had led to a SWAT 
assault. Since many non-Russian analysts viewed 
the Putinist state as a throwback to Soviet-style au-
thoritarian rule, it was simply assumed that Russian 
policymakers did not care about collateral damage at 
the school. Ideological filters thus played a major role 
in interpreting the outcome of the attack. 
A similar bias was evident with regard to Mumbai. 
The only difference was that such bias was moti-
vated by high politics. Several foreign commenta-
tors focused exclusively on the chaotic response 
of Indian security forces, thereby downplaying the 
cross-border nature of the attacks. Within this de-
nunciatory context, India’s policy of using minimum 
force against domestic security threats was ridiculed. 
Much discussion focused on how the Mumbai po-
lice lacked assault weapons to confront the terror-
ists. Yet, when the Norwegian police turned out to 
be equally unprepared in responding to a massacre, 
no similar criticism was made. Apparently, when 
policemen in Norway walk around without firearms, 
they are practising community-friendly policing. 
When Indian policemen do the same, they are in-
competent. 
Importantly, there is a dichotomy between the 
guesswork and politically motivated punditry of 
media commentators, on the one hand, and genu-
ine security professionals, on the other. The latter 
have studied all three attacks, Beslan, Mumbai and 
Utøya, and noted that no major errors were made at 
the tactical level. The Russians, Indians and Nor-
wegians responded in the best manner possible to 
a new threat with which they were each unfamiliar. 
One American police officer has argued that for all 
the snide commentary on Indian counterterrorist 
units, no US police force would be able to handle a 
situation similar to the Mumbai attacks any better. 
This has been proven by numerous drills that Amer-
ican security agencies have carried out in recent 
years. Thus, while non-experts continue harping on 
organisational shortcomings, more insightful studies 
have revealed that the real problem is systemic: ex-
isting counterterrorist response concepts are not op-
timised to deal with well-planned suicidal attacks on 
soft targets, where negotiation has virtually no role. 
In the final analysis, as far as public perception is 
concerned, counterterrorist SWAT units are damned 
if they do and damned if they don’t. If they carry out 
an early storming operation in a conventional hos-
tage situation and civilians end up being killed in 
the crossfire, the commandos would be portrayed as 
incompetent. If they respond as per the established 
procedure of assault being a last resort and terrorists 
use the intervening time to massacre civilians, they 
would be blamed for a slow response. All that sepa-
rates success from failure in counterterrorist rescue 
missions, therefore, is the intention of the terrorist. 
Does he aim to keep his victims alive while holding 
the government to ransom, or simply kill them before 
or during a CT assault? Being able to answer this 
question as early as possible is vital, if civilian lives 
are to be saved. 
Yet, finding an answer is not easy, due to the con-
fusion and lack of information which initially ham-
pers every counterterrorist response. Usually, the 
most important pieces of intelligence are not read-
ily available: the layout of the attack site, the num-
ber of attackers and the number of people already 
killed. While government agencies are groping for a 
response, the media begin counting back from the 
start of the crisis and passing comment on the ef-
forts of counterterrorist units in real time. Not only 
does this provide valuable information to the terror-
ists, but it also sets an unrealistically high standard 
for SWAT units to achieve. They are now expected 
to rescue all hostages safely, in the shortest possible 
span of time. 
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‘actIve shooter’ scenarIo 
In all three cases – Beslan, Mumbai and Utøya – lo-
cal police and CT-SWAT personnel acted out their 
assigned roles in a phased manner, as prescribed by 
the ‘cordon and negotiate’ concept. The local police, 
as first responders, settled into a secondary role very 
early in each crisis and left specialist assault units 
with the task of engaging the terrorists. They did 
so not out of cowardice but due to lack of training 
and equipment for a more proactive response. Un-
fortunately, this meant that in each case, terrorists 
were able to accomplish their primary objective of 
massacring civilians before CT units could arrive and 
intervene. 
The problem is that ‘contain and negotiate’ is reac-
tive in a double sense. Firstly, it focuses on scenarios 
where terrorists choose to initiate an incident and 
take hostages, rather than on focusing on ‘hot pur-
suit’ of terrorists into their own safe havens. Thus, 
terrorists are left free to decide at leisure on the na-
ture of their target and the timing and technique of 
the attack. SWAT units, on the other hand, are ex-
pected to be ready throughout the year for immedi-
ate deployment. Secondly, the concept assumes that 
if terrorists want to kill their hostages anyway, there 
is nothing that can be done to stop them. A storming 
action, therefore, only makes sense if the terrorists 
enter into negotiations and then begin to kill hos-
tages as a pressure tactic. Crucially, the concept does 
not make allowance for a situation where the terror-
ists have no interest in negotiation in the first place, 
but just want to kill people. 
For twenty-seven years, the limitations of ‘contain 
and negotiate’ went unacknowledged even within 
the United States – the country that had first for-
mulated the concept. Its supporters pointed out that 
according to empirical research, 79 per cent of all 
hostage deaths occurred as a result of botched up 
rescue attempts. However, views began to change 
in 1999, when two teenaged gunmen attacked the 
Columbine High School in the US state of Colorado. 
In fifteen minutes, they killed thirteen people before 
committing suicide. Local police units were unpre-
pared to intervene, having been trained in a response 
model that demarcated their role as one of contain-
ment (i.e. setting up a security cordon) rather than 
engagement. Faced with an ‘active shooter’ scenario, 
where continuous killings were carried out from the 
start of a crisis, all their training was useless. 
From studies of similar incidents, as well as research 
on the Mumbai attacks, Western law enforcement 
agencies have started developing a new tactical re-
sponse concept. Although it is not known to have 
any name as yet, it can be loosely described as an 
‘engage and eliminate’ paradigm. The idea is to ad-
vance quickly towards the sound of gunfire and neu-
tralise the killers through ‘swarming tactics’, rather 
than waiting for them to do even more damage. In-
tervention at the earliest stages of a massacre is the 
only way to keep the body count low. Unfortunately, 
this means that some deaths are simply unavoidable. 
All rescue personnel can do is to limit the damage, 
by going immediately into attack mode. 
Such a conceptual shift has become necessary due 
to the changing nature of terrorism. The three con-
ventional hostage incidents described at the start 
of this essay – the Lufthansa hijacking, the Iranian 
embassy siege and the seizure of the Japanese am-
bassador’s residence in Peru – all allowed CT-SWAT 
units time to plan a deliberate assault. The terror-
ists in each case were focused on negotiating their 
way out of the security cordon that had been thrown 
around them, while also keeping their hostages alive 
in order to retain leverage during talks. Even when 
hostages were killed, they were killed one at a time, 
thus giving security forces early warning of the ter-
rorists’ intentions and ample time to react. 
Today, when terrorists aim to kill as many people in 
as little time as possible, any delay in aggressively 
engaging them increases the risk to the hostages. 
This is because, as the case of Beslan proved, hold-
ing back allows the terrorists to consolidate their 
p osition. Not only does the complexity of rescue 
operations increase, but the chances of hostage sur-
vival are reduced since the terrorists have time to 
turn their anger onto their victims. Only by closing 
in rapidly with the terrorists can commandos ensure 
that civilians stand a realistic chance of survival. 
During Mumbai, anytime the terrorists encountered 
a sudden threat to their own lives, they concentrated 
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on either escaping from the scene or firing back at 
security forces. They did not have time to turn upon 
civilians who were in their immediate vicinity. What-
ever additional killings occurred, took place during 
gaps in the fighting.9 
dIfferences between ‘contaIn and negotIate’ and ‘engage and  
elImInate’ sItuatIons 
Contain and negotiate Engage and eliminate 
Terrorist intention To hold civilian lives to ransom To carry out deliberate killings 
Role of hostages Used as bargaining chips in negotia-
tions. Treated humanely except dur-
ing periods of tension with government 
negotiators
Used as human shields, if taken at 
all. Treated brutally to create a fear 
psychosis and sustain media atten-
tion 
Terrorist endgame To escape if possible, once political 
goals are achieved 
To sacrifice self, after killing as many 
as possible 
Role of time Benefits security forces, who stall ter-
rorists and plan deliberate assault 
Benefits terrorists, who stall security 
forces and consolidate their position 
Lead role in rescue effort Top-level policymakers and govern-
ment negotiating team 
Field-level SWAT personnel highly 
trained in close quarters battle 
PreParIng for another attack 
As a first step towards preparing for another mass 
casualty attack, situation analysis cells can be set up 
within CT-SWAT units. These cells would receive 
situation updates as soon as first reports of an in-
cident appeared. The cells would focus on just one 
question: does the choice of target(s) suggest that 
the terrorists have limited aims and intend to negoti-
ate over these, or are they only focused on creating 
a media spectacle? If the attack site is huge (such 
as a shopping mall or a major school) and the num-
ber of potential victims is large, this would indicate 
that the terrorists are suicidal. A bigger building with 
multiple access points is typically, less defensible 
than a smaller one. Since the terrorists would any-
way be cut off from reinforcement, they would logi-
cally not attack a large complex unless they have no 
plans for a long-drawn engagement. A large number 
of potential victims would likewise suggest that the 
terrorists are not concerned with subduing resist-
ance and controlling their immediate environment, 
but only want to cause maximum casualties. Final 
confirmation of their intentions would arrive once 
reports started coming in of civilian deaths in the 
initial moments of a terrorist attack. Such killings 
would automatically rule out the possibility of nego-
tiations, since the government would not be able to 
offer leniency to the perpetrators. 
Once it has been determined that the attack is aimed 
at massacring civilians, the next step would be to de-
ploy as many SWAT commandos as can realistically 
be sent, while coordinating an offensive response by 
local security forces. Such a response, provided it is 
sustained, would prevent the terrorists from being 
able to consolidate their position and would also 
provide covering fire for civilians trapped within the 
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area to escape. Thereafter, using many commandos 
would allow a building to be stormed simultaneously 
from multiple entry points. This would reduce the 
terrorists’ superiority in tactical intelligence. Even if 
they know the building’s layout better than the res-
cue team, they still will not know how many direc-
tions the SWAT teams are advancing from. Also, at 
close quarters, the intense but still surgical firepower 
that a large and well-trained rescue force would em-
ploy is likely to prove crucial in saving lives. It would 
cause the terrorists to bunch together, such that they 
can be segregated from any hostages that they might 
have gathered. It would also allow commandos to 
manoeuvre into position between the two. 
Finally, past trends in terrorist behaviour suggest that 
tactical autonomy is the key to success, both for ter-
rorists as well as for security forces. In Mumbai, the 
five fidayeen buddy pairs were at their most effective 
during the initial hours of the onslaught, when they 
instinctively took advantage of opportunities that 
appeared before them. No amount of intelligence 
analysis could have predicted their next move, for 
the simple reason that not even the terrorists knew 
what it would be. Later, upon growing psychologi-
cally dependent on the advice of their controllers in 
Pakistan, they switched to a defensive stance. By 
that time, all the killings had already taken place. 
Thus, although the controllers in Pakistan prolonged 
the crisis, their micromanagement also caused the 
terrorists to lose tactical initiative. 
The case of Beslan demonstrates that it is the 
d ecisions of commanders in the field rather than 
policymakers that really determine the outcome of 
counterterrorist operations. This has particularly se-
rious implications for suicidal terrorist attacks on soft 
targets. Waiting for high-level clearance to intervene 
and stop a massacre is simply not an option and the 
decision-making process needs to accommodate 
this reality. In cases of suicidal attack, the most ef-
fective response is the nineteenth-century Prussian 
philosophy of auftragstaktik, or literally, mission- 
specific tactics. Rather than a centralised process 
where orders are transmitted down a chain of com-
mand, operational directives need to be issued as 
close to the level at which they are meant to be im-
plemented. This means that SWAT officers should 
engage targets upon their own discretion, once the 
need for immediate action has become clear. 
In conclusion, the role of SWAT in counterterrorism 
is set to become more important than ever before. 
During the 1970s and ’80s, such units operated 
in a supportive role to negotiation teams. Even if 
the popular media remained fixated on comman-
dos rather than negotiators, the success of a hos-
tage rescue mission would be decided by whether 
continuous dialogue could tire out the terrorists, or 
else distract them at a crucial moment. Today how-
ever, negotiators have next to no role in preventing 
a massacre of hostages, once terrorists have decided 
to carry one out. It is only SWAT that can save the 
lives of innocents. Governments, therefore, need to 
recognise the changing nature of terrorism and suit-
ably upgrade the reaction capabilities of their own 
counterterrorist units. 
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endnotes
1 A brief note on nomenclature: readers are advised that the term ‘CT-SWAT’, as used in this essay, refers both to 
police SWAT units deployed on CT missions and to military CT units trained in SWAT methods. The term signifies 
a fusion of police and military tactical concepts, for use in rare situations precipitated by armed terrorist assaults.
2 The Israeli intelligence service had not anticipated that the Palestinians would adopt airline hijacking as a tactic in 
their war against Israel. It was thus forced to play catch-up with the terrorists (Thomas 2000, 147–148). 
3 The concept was outlined in great detail in a book written by some of its formulators. The hostage rescue section of 
the book is well worth reading, primarily to appreciate how dated its precepts are in the context of suicidal terrorism 
today. At one point, the authors suggest that people killed during hostage incidents bring about their own demise 
by provoking the terrorists needlessly (Bolz Jr, Dudonis and Schulz 1996, 57–61). 
4 British commentators liked to peddle the notion that the SAS contribution to the German rescue operation was cru-
cial. It was, but only in a technical sense. The two British advisors did not, contrary to leaked reports in the British 
press, actually lead the operation. All they were permitted to do was observe its implementation from the sidelines, 
as per existing counterterrorist cooperation arrangements between NATO countries. 
5 The 9/11 attacks were preceded by other attempts at suicidal hijacking. In 1994, Algerian jihadists hijacked an 
Air France aircraft with the aim of crashing it into the Eiffel Tower. Upon learning of their plans, the pilot landed 
in Marseilles, ostensibly to refuel. There, French commandos terminated the hijacking. From this incident, jihadist 
militants understood that an airborne suicidal assault would need trained pilots in order to overcome resistance 
from the airline crew (Miller, Stone and Mitchell 2002, 263–264).
6 Some might argue that the situation at the Jewish cultural centre was a hostage crisis, which was badly handled 
by Indian security forces. This would be a misleading argument: NSG commandos had deliberately held back from 
attacking the building out of concern for the safety of civilians trapped inside. Based on post-incident investiga-
tions, however, it is now known that Lashkar-e-Toiba had planned all along to kill the occupants, in order to vitiate 
relations between India and Israel. The commandos had only stormed the building after intercepted telephone 
conversations between the terrorists and their leaders in Karachi confirmed that the hostages had in fact, already 
been killed much earlier in the attack. 
7 Other sources give the time as 1522 hrs. This is the only discrepancy in the timeline of the Oslo–Utøya attacks. 
8 In some cases, even government officials, who should know better, fall into the trap of being politically correct 
and thereby distort their analysis of how hostage crises can be resolved. For instance, in the autumn of 1985, 
four Soviet diplomats were abducted in Lebanon by an Islamist group. Since the crisis was speedily resolved, after 
the killing of one hostage, it is just assumed by some commentators that the Soviet government must have made 
concessions to the terrorists (Pachnanda 2002, 199–200). In fact, Spetsnaz commandos had kidnapped a relative 
of the hostage-takers (who had been previously identified by intelligence agents), killed him by slow mutilation and 
issued a warning that more such actions would follow if the Soviet diplomats were not immediately released. They 
were. 
9 Interestingly, the same behaviour was observed of the Palestinian terrorists who carried out the Munich Olympics 
Massacre. They did not kill their hostages until quite late in the battle at the airfield. Whether this was because of 
moral inhibitions (highly unlikely, since they had already killed two Israelis) or because they were too focused on 
retaliating to police firing, is not important. The fact remains that their attention was focused on saving themselves. 
Only when it became clear that they had no chance of escape did they turn on the hostages, having been given 
several opportunities by the police to assess and re-assess their tactical position, in the vain hope that they would 
surrender (Jonas 2006, 6). 
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